In this paper 1 we present a new approach for the secure and robust copyright protection of digital images. We describe a system for generating digital watermarks and for trading watermarked images. The system is based on a new watermarking technique, which is robust against image transformation techniques such as compression, rotation, translation, scaling and cropping. It uses modulation of the magnitude components in Fourier space to embed a watermark and an accompanying template and, during watermark extraction, reads a template in the log polar transform of the frequency domain. The template is used for analyzing scaling and rotation su ered by the watermarked stego-image. The detection of the watermarks is also possible without any need for the original cover-image. In addition, the system applies asymmetric cryptographic protocols for di erent purposes, namely embedding/detecting the watermark and transferring watermarked data. The public key technique is applied for the construction of a one-way watermark embedding and the veri cation function to identify and prove the uniqueness of the watermark. Legal dispute resolution is supported for the multiple watermarking of a digital image without revealing the con dential keying information.
Introduction
The current rapid development and deployment of new IT technologies for the fast provision of commercial multimedia services has resulted in a strong demand for reliable and secure copyright protection techniques for multimedia data. Copyright protection of digital images is de ned as the process of proving the intellectual property rights to a court of law against the unauthorized reproduction, processing, transformation or broadcasting of a digital image. Depending on the law in various countries, this process may be based on a prior registration of the copyright with a trusted third party. After successful registration, the copyright ownership is legally bound by a copyright notice, which is required to notify and prove copyright ownership.
Digital watermarking is a method for marking data sets, such as images, sound or video. A stego data set consists of the original data, the cover data set and a digital watermark that does not a ect the data set's usability but that can be detected using dedicated analysis software or systems. Watermarking can, for example, be used for marking authorship or ownership of a data set.
Quite a number of di erent approaches 5,6,8{11, 13,18,19,25,26,30{37,39,40] to digital watermarking have been proposed but only some of them implemented in commercial products. Due to the very short time and minimal e ort needed for copying and distributing digital multimedia data, protection against copyright infringements is an important issue for the copyright owner and should form an integral part of the exploitation process for Internet based trading services. Today, the Internet community has not identi ed or accepted adequate copyright protection techniques. This is in direct contrast to the provision of secure transaction protocols, such as SSL 12].
2 State-of-the-art Digital watermarking can be seen as being fundamentally a problem in digital communications 5]. Early methods of encoding watermarks consisted of no more than incrementing an image component to encode a binary '1' and decrementing to encode a '0 ' 6] . Tirkel et al. 34] and van Schyndel et al. 35] have applied the properties of m?sequences to produce oblivious watermarks resistant to ltering, cropping and reasonably robust to cryptographic attack. Matsui and Tanaka 19] have applied linear predictive coding for watermarking. Their approach to hide a watermark is to make the watermark resemble quantization noise. Tirkel and Osborne 34] were the rst to note the applicability of spread spectrum techniques to digital image watermarking. Spread spectrum has several advantageous features. It o ers cryptographic security (see 34] ) and is capable of achieving error free transmission of the watermark at the limits given by the maximum channel capacity 30]. Fundamental information theoretic limits to reliable communication have been discussed by some authors (see 30] ). The shorter is the payload of a watermark, the better are the chances of it being communicated reliably.
Spread spectrum is an example of a symmetric key cryptosystem 31]. System security is based on proprietary knowledge of the keys (or pseudo random seeds) which are required to embed, extract or remove an image watermark. One provision in the use of a spread spectrum system is that it is important that the watermarking be non-invertible because only in this way can true ownership of the copyright material be resolved 8]. O Ruanaidh et al. 25] and Cox et al. 5] have developed perceptually adaptive transform domain methods for watermarking. In contrast to previous approaches the emphasis was on embedding the watermark in the most signi cant components of an image. The general approach used in these papers is to divide the image into blocks. Each block is mapped into the transform domain using either the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) 28], the Hadamard Transform 7] or the Daubechies Wavelet Transform 29] . Information has been embedded using the DCT 26] The industrial importance of digital copyright protection has resulted in a number of products, either based on speci c watermark techniques or additional registration services. They include the PictureMarc system by Digimarc, SureSign (former FBI's Fingerprint) by HighWater Signum, IP2 system by Intellectual Protocols, the Argent system by Digital Information Commodities Exchange and the Tigermark system from NEC. Further some prototypes have been developed among which are the PixelTag system by the MIT Media Lab and the SysCop system from Zhao and Koch of the Frauenhofer-Institut f ur Graphische Datenverarbeitung 39, 40] . Many of these systems have been subject to attacks, that destroy the marking or at least reveal signi cant limitations of the marking techniques 2,3,17,24,27].
Overview
We envision the watermark system operating an open environment like the Internet with di erent interconnected computers. Users can be located anywhere and can sell or buy images. If legal dispute resolution for multiple watermarks is needed the Copyright Holder (H) sends copyright information and authentic image information to the Copyright Certi cate Center (C). After having received a copyright certi cate from C, the copyright holder can sell his digital images, for example, via an image shopping mall, to an image buyer (B). The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) supports the distribution of authentic public keys between all parties which are needed for mutual authentication, non-repudiation and con dentiality. The communication channels between the parties are shown in gure 1. Fig. 1 . Communication channels between identi ed parties Our approach enables the secure generation and transmission of watermarked data using an asymmetric key pair like applied in public-key cryptography. The cover data set is watermarked, while the watermark is encoded using one or both of these keys. The resulting stego data set is then transmitted to a second party, while the same keys are used for establishing a secure transmission between the parties. During the trading process, the involved parties use asymmetric key pairs and a key agreement protocol for establishing a symmetric key between them. The party creating the watermark can embed a private, a detection and a public watermark in the data set. The public watermark can be detected by third parties while the private and detection watermark can only be detected by the copyright holder. After embedding the digital watermark into the image, the information describing it, such as the image identi er, a textual description and related information is transmitted authentically to a registration party that permanently stores a record relating to this stego data set and issues a copyright certi cate which it stores and transmits to the copyright holder. A template pattern is added to the Fourier transform of an image to be watermarked. For checking the watermark, the Fourier transform of the stego-image is calculated. >From this Fourier transform, the log polar mapping transform is generated, which is then searched for the modulation pattern. Using the log polar transform of the Fourier transform has the advantage that scaling and rotation of the stego-image are expressed as translations. This allows an easy search for rotation and scaling using cross-correlation techniques. The magnitude components of the Fourier transform of each image block is modulated using the same pattern in each block. This method provides robustness against cropping of the stego-image because the magnitude spectrum is invariant to circular translations (cyclic shifts) and cropping leads to a circular translation of the watermark in each block.
Threat model
For the reader's convenience we describe di erent scenarios with typical people, such as Alice, Bob and Mallet. Alice is the copyright holder. She has taken a very valuable photograph, scanned it and would like to sell it to Bob in digital form. Mallet would also like to sell or distribute the image himself. He has a lot of computing power and he can listen and intercept/change any information that Alice and Bob transmitted on the Internet. Figure 2 shows a basic commercial scenario. We list the encountered risks for each party in table 1.
Fig. 2. Main transactions during watermarking
It is beyond the scope of the paper to discuss all possible threats in detail. We have listed them in table 1 along with the exploitation assessment. We now analyse some of the risks for Alice and Bob. Alice's main interest is to protect her cover-image, register it and receive a legally bound copyright certi cate from C. She wants to have guarantee that nobody can access the cover-image and that the copyright certi cate is saved permanently by C. When registering the image, Alice wants to be certain that she receives a copyright certi cate for a novel image and that the legal binding is guaranteed by C. She can, therefore, successfully sue fraudulent behaviour. Bob is particularly interested to receive the images he wants and he has paid for. Mallet on the other hand is very antisocial and tries to hurt Alice or Bob wherever possible. Mallet tries to steal information and sell it himself. We discuss some of the important threats that have been identi ed:
(1) Mallet buys the image but distributes it further Mallet has bought an image from Alice. Without Alice's approval, he sells it himself.
(2) Mallet embeds his own watermark and registers the image himself Mallet buys an image from Alice and embeds himself a watermark . He then lls in his copyright information and registers the image at his C. 5 Copyright Protection and Image Owner Authentication Depending on the proof-level to be provided for the protection, our approach provides three increasing levels of reliability, namely: individual copyright pro- Alice denies to have sent a copyright request to C Low tection, copyright protection with registered cryptographic keys and copyright protection with C on the basis of registered cryptographic keys. The present method is based on an image owner authentication technique, described below, which embeds and detects the Image Authentication Data (IAD) as the payload of a watermark. The applied image owner authentication technique is based on a perceptually adaptive spread spectrum technique. This technique provides reliable means of embedding robust watermarks. Such a technique will be discussed in section 6. In addition, a spread spectrum techniques is a form of symmetric cryptosystem. In order to embed or extract a watermark, it is necessary to know the exact values of the seed used to produce pseudo random sequences used to encode a watermark. The seeds are considered to be cryptographic keys for watermark generation and veri cation. System security is therefore based on proprietary knowledge of private keys, which provide in addition the necessary security parameters needed for a secure communication (mutual authentication, integrity, con dentiality, non-repudiation) in the trading process of digital images. Because spread spectrum signals are statistically independent (and therefore virtually orthogonal), the present method and apparatus encodes more than one watermark in an image at the same time, namely a private, a detection and a public watermark. The detection watermark is embedded under a xed random seed which serves H to e ciently search for his images on the internet. He has to check only one embedding per picture to nd the locations of his pictures. The public watermark indicates that the image is copyright material and provide information on true ownership. At the same time there is a secure private watermark whose secrecy depends on the private key of H. Since the public key of H is registered, H can prove that he is the only person in the possession of the adequate private key and therefore the generator of the private watermark. The system also provides the secure registration (mutual authentication, integrity, non-repudiation) of watermark encoded images (data sets) at C. Derived data of the stego image is registered at C and a signed digital copyright certi cate is generated by C and transmitted to H. If an unauthorized third party has also encoded watermarks in the same image, con icting claims in copyright disputes can be resolved, as only one of the two parties has a copyright certi cate of the image containing only its watermark. The other party, who redistributed the original watermarked image, has only a certi cate on the image where both watermarks are embedded and thus can be identi ed as the cheating party. Watermark protection with registered cryptographic keys and C based copyright protection are based on a PKI. The PKI issues on request public key certi cates, e.g. X.509 certi cates, containing the public key of the party, its distinguished name and a time stamp. Every certi cate is signed with the PKI's private key and the trust is built on the validity of the authentic copy of the PKI's public key (we assume that the public key of the PKI is accessible, authentically distributed and veri able by every party).
Cryptographic mechanisms
The following cryptographic mechanisms are used in the description 21]:
(SigMR G (x; m; ), SigMR V (y; ; m)): A probabilistic digital signature scheme with message recovery, where (x; y) denotes the key pair of the signer, m the input data to be signed and the signature, ( In principle, all known signature schemes and authentic key exchange protocols might be used with our protocols. Nevertheless to obtain an e cient variant, we propose to choose the Nyberg-Rueppel signature scheme with message recovery in a small mode, where both signature parameters are computed in a small subgroup of order q 23, 15] and q has about 160 bit. For the siganture scheme with appendix one might choose an e cient variant of the Meta-ElGamal signature scheme 14] in small mode. As asymmetric key agreement protocol, we propose to choose a three-pass scheme with mutual implicit authentication, as proposed in 16] as class 7. The hash function h 1 should return a hash value of 64 bit and might e.g. be de ned as a :=RIPEMD-128(m); a = a 1 jja 2 ; h 1 (m) = a 1 a 2 :
The hash function h 2 should return a hash value of 160 bit (e.g. SHA-1 or RIPEMD-160).
Individual Copyright Protection
During individual copyright protection only the copyright holder H with distinguished name H and asymmetric key pair (x H ; y H ) is involved. The following steps are applied:
( 
Cryptographic properties
Besides the robustness of the watermarks against various image transformations, which is discussed in section 6.4, the embedding of the private watermark o ers useful cryptographic properties:
The seed for embedding the private watermark is probabilistic, as it depends on the output of a probabilistic signature scheme. Thus even if the private watermark in one image is detected this doesn't allow an attacker to nd immediately the private watermarks in other protected images.
The seed for embedding is image-dependent. Thus an attacker who knows a valid image ID can't embed this under a di erent seed, as this wouldn't t with the recovered ID from the signature with message used to generate the seed. The same is true for an attacker who knows a valid signed seed and wants to use this to embed his own image ID. The private watermark o ers non-repudiation, as it can only be generated by the copyright holder, who knows the corresponding private key. This allows the proof of ownership to a judge. The signature with message recovery remains secret until H has to prove his ownership to a court. In this case, he doesn't have to reveal a secret to the court, which would enable it to generate valid private watermarks instead of H afterwards. The payload is very short. One could think of embedding the signed image ID under a random seed instead of the described method. This leads to a longer message, which is not as robust as the chosen one, if we assume that the image ID consists of e.g. 12 byte. The shortest known signature scheme with message recovery 23, 15] produces already a signature of length 20 byte. i.e. it is 80% longer.
Trading of digital images
Two parties are involved in the trading of digital images: the H and the image buyer B with distinguished name B . Suppose (x H ; y H ) is the asymmetric key pair of H and (x B ; y B ) is the asymmetric key pair of B. Suppose H has an authentic copy of y B and B has an authentic copy of y H before they start any communication. The following steps are applied during the trading of digital images:
( In the case of watermark protection with registered keys, the generation of the same asymmetric key pair by two distinguished entities can be prevented.
Copyright Protection with Registered Keys
The copyright protection with registered cryptographic keys needs three parties, namely H with name H , B with name B and the PKI with name I . Suppose (x H ; y H ), (x B ; y B ), (x I ; y I ) are the unique key pairs of H, B, and I respectively. Suppose, H has an authentic and actual copy of Cert B which signature was veri ed with the authentic copy of y I and B has an authentic and actual copy of Cert H which signature was veri ed with the authentic copy of y I . Then the same steps as for the individual watermark protection are applied.
Remark:
Since the generated asymmetric key pairs are unique, H can be uniquely identi ed if no additional watermarks by unauthorized persons have been encoded into a given SI. The O based watermark protection described below provides the necessary countermeasures to prevent this threat.
Copyright Protection based on a Copyright Center
The system for copyright protection based on a Copyright Center has four participants, namely H with name H , B with name B , the PKI with name I and C with name C . Suppose (x H ; y H ), (x B ; y B ), (x I ; y I ) and (x C ; y C ) are the unique key pairs of H, B, I and C, respectively. H has an authentic copy of Cert B and Cert C whose signatures were veri ed with the authentic copy of y I , B has an authentic copy of Cert H and Cert C whose signatures were veri ed with the authentic copy of y I and C has an authentic copy of Cert H and Cert B whose signatures were veri ed with the authentic copy of y I . The following steps are applied:
(1) Steps 1. ( Remark B may check the copyright certi cate requesting C to transfer an authentic copy of the copyright certi cate for a given image identi er ID I . Except the data transfer, the applied protocol is similar to the one described above. If B would like to transfer a speci c copyright of a CI to another legal party, he may initiate a copyright revocation request with C. The di erent phases of this request are analogue to the copyright request.
Watermark detection
The system for private watermark detection is executed by a single process, the H with distinguished name name H . H must be able to detect if an image GI in a list of images is protected with its copyright. Therefore he has to check, if its detection watermark is embedded in GI.
Watermark veri cation
In the case of a dispute, a judge must be able to check private watermarks in stego-images. The system for private watermark veri cation is partitioned into two processes, namely H with distinguished name H and the judge with distinguished name J .
(1) H forwards name H ; SI; SigCCD and Sig(ID I ) to J.
(2) J veri es CC = fname C jjname H jjSNjjID I jjh 2 
Oblivious Image Owner Authentication
The watermarking technique comprises the following components:
(1) An error-control coding technique for the payload to be transmitted in the watermark. (2) An encoding technique to encode the resulting message. (3) A reliable method for embedding the encoded message in the image without introducing visible artefacts.
Components 1 and 2 apply to embed watermarks in any type of data while component 3 is speci c to the embedding of watermarks in images.
Error control coding
Error control coding is applied to the message prior to encoding in order to include redundancy, which makes the scheme more robust. Symbol based Reed Solomon (RS) codes are applied for this purpose. The advantages are:
RS codes are capable of correcting symbol errors rather than bit errors and RS decoders can correct erasures as well as errors.
The erasure correcting capability is particularly useful for channels, which provide reliability information on the received symbols. Symbols with low reliability are treated as erased symbols. This approach is e cient in terms of error correction since one error can be traded against two erasures in the decoding process.
RS codes have xed lengths, which depend on the size of the symbol alphabet. For 8-bit symbols, RS codes have a length of 255 and they are convenient for byte oriented data. In watermarking one wishes to use codes of shorter lengths than 255. Such codes are easily obtained from the original RS codes by puncturing or shortening (cf. 4]).
Encoding the message
During encoding, the message to be transmitted in the watermark is transformed into a form suitable for use in the modulation of image components. At the same time, it is encrypted using a suitable key.
One can easily combine spread spectrum based watermarking with the cryptographic key distribution techniques described earlier. The encoding procedure has access to the cryptographic keys x H and y H (or their hash values), which are used to generate the seeds for the pseudo-random sequences as described below. Knowledge of the corresponding key is required for recovering the message from the watermark.
A watermark can be embedded or extracted by the key owner using the same key. >From the point of view of embedding watermarks in images given the cryptographic keys the sequences themselves can be generated. A good spread spectrum sequence is one which combines desirable statistical properties such as uniformly low cross correlation with cryptographic security.
Suppose we are given a message M (for example, that was provided with error coding). The message has the binary form b 1 b 2 : : : b L , where b i are its bits. This can be written in the form of a set of symbols s 1 s 2 : : : s M { most generally by a change in a number base from 2 to B. The next stage is to encode each symbol s i in the form of a pseudo random vector of length N, wherein each element of this vector either takes the value 0 or 1. N is, for example, in the order of 1000 to 10000 (typically in the order of 10% of the total number of Fourier components that can, theoretically, be modulated).
To encode the rst symbol a pseudo random sequence v of length N + B ? 1 is generated. To encode a symbol of values where 0 < s < B the elements v s ; v s+1 : : : v s+N?1 are extracted as a vector r 1 of length N. For the next symbol another independent pseudo random sequence is generated and the symbol encoded as a random vector r 2 . Each successive symbol is encoded in the same way. Alternatively, one can use any the N cyclic shifts of the pseudo random sequence v. Note that even if the same symbol occurs in di erent positions in the sequence, no collision is possible because the random sequences used to encode them are di erent | in fact they are statistically independent. Finally the entire sequence of symbols is encoded as the summation: m = P i=1::M r i The pseudo-random vector m has N elements, each varying between 0 and M. In a next step, the elements of m are o set to make their mean zero. When decoding the watermark, a vector m 0 (read-out message) is derived from the stego-image. In oblivious watermarking, m 0 corresponds to the modulated Fourier coe cients. Due to distortions su ered by the stego-image due to image processing, in general m 0 will not be equal to but will be \statisti-cally similar" to m. To decode s from m 0 , the elements of m 0 are rst o set to make their mean zero. Then, starting from the (known) seed, the rst random sequence v of length N + B ? 1 is generated and the correlation of v with m 0 is calculated. The peak of the correlation indicates the o set s 1 in the random sequence that was used for generating r 1 . Then, the next random sequence v is generated and cross-correlated with m 0 to retrieve s 2 , etc. Reliable communications of the system are best accommodated by using m?sequences that possess minimum cross correlation with each other. This is the same as maximizing the Euclidean distance between vectors v 1 ; v 2 ; v 3 : : :. If M is suciently large, the statistical distribution of the message m should approach a Gaussian distribution (according to the Central Limit Theorem). A Gaussian distributed watermark has the advantage that it is somewhat more di cult to detect. The variance increases with order M 1=2 ; in other words, the expected peak excursion of the sequence is only order M 1=2 .
Oblivious Image Authentication Algorithm
In this section, we describe how to embed the encoded message m in the image in the form of a watermark. The method is designed for robustness to operations generally applied to images such as translation, cropping, rotating and scaling. (The method is not designed for other types of data such as sound or text.) In order to achieve robustness against circular translation, each image block is rst subjected to a Fourier transform and the same watermark is embedded in each block so the watermark tiles the entire image. Then, message m modulates the Fourier components. In addition to this, a template is embedded in the image, which can be used for detecting a rotation and scaling of the image when reading the watermark. Given a cover image the steps for embedding a watermark in the image are as follows:
(1) If the image is a colour image, then compute the luminance component and imaginary components obtained in this way, calculate the corresponding magnitude and phase components. The magnitude components are translation invariant and will therefore be used in the following modulation steps. (However, it is possible to derive translation invariants from the phase spectrum as well, which could also be modulated). (5) Select the magnitude components to be modulated. To encode a message m of length N, a total number of N components are modulated. In non-oblivious watermarking, any components can be modulated. For oblivious watermarking, because of the interference of the cover-image with the watermark, the largest magnitude components are avoided and only a band of frequencies are used. These mid band frequencies are chosen because they generally give a good compromise between robustness and visibility of the watermark. There are two methods for selecting the components to be modulated: The selection of the components to be modulated does not depend on the given image. Rather, the same components are selected for every image. The author as well as the reader of the watermark know the positions of the components to be selected in advance. The largest components (inside the allowable frequency range) are used for modulation using a perceptually adaptive approach. (6) Add a template by a second modulation of the magnitude components. This is described in more detail below. (7) Compute the inverse FFT using the phase components and the modulated magnitude components. The lower the perceptual signi cance, the higher should be the amplitude of the watermark. However, for simplicity, the amplitude for all components is usually kept constant.
Template
As mentioned above, a template is added to the image in step 6. The following steps have to be executed:
(1) Apply a log-polar map to the magnitude components, i.e. transform them into a polar coordinate system ( ; log ? r) with an angular and a logarithmic radius axis respectively. In this representation, a scaling of the image leads to an o set of the components along the log ?r axis. A rotation of the image leads to an o set along the axis. Preferably, low pass ltering is used for interpolating the frequency space components during this mapping. The magnitude components belonging to very low or high frequencies are not mapped. The following modulation is only applied to components in midband frequency range. (2) Select the magnitude components in the log-polar coordinate system to be modulated. Typically, as few as 10 components can be modulated. The pattern T formed by the selected components in log polar space should be such that its auto-correlation under translation is weak. There should be as little ambiguity as possible in matching the shifted stego-image with the template. For this purpose, the indices of the selected components should be coprime or at least be derived from a two-dimensional random sequence. (3) Map the modulated points by a change of coordinates back into frequency space. The pattern T formed by the selected components in log polar space is prede ned and known to the reader of the watermark. It must be noted that the calculation of the log-polar transform is not required for embedding the template. The pattern T of the components to be modulated in log-polar space can be mapped back to the corresponding components in frequency space.
As will be explained below, the template is not required for non-oblivious watermarking (since the original image can be used as the "template", in other words, the stego-image can be registered with the original image). Also if the image is a colour image then the luminance image is used during the following operations:
(1) Divide the image into adjacent blocks of size 128 128.
(2) Map the image luminance levels (or gray levels) to the perceptually \ at" domain by replacing them with their logarithm. (3) For each block compute the FFT. (4) Determine the rotation and scaling that the image su ered by nding the template in log-polar space and compensate for the rotation and scale. (5) Read the modulated components to generate message m 0 . (6) Once that the message m' is recovered, it is demodulated and error corrected using the methods described earlier.
Finding the template The steps for nding the template are as follows:
(1) Apply a log-polar mapping to the magnitude components of the Fourier transform. The magnitude components in the very low or high frequency range are not mapped. The log-polar mapping is only applied to components in midband frequency range. (2) For oblivious watermarking, calculate the normalized cross correlation of the components in log-polar space with the template pattern T that was used for generating the template in step 6 and nd the point of best correlation. If the image has neither been rotated or scaled, this point is at the origin. Scaling leads to a corresponding o set along the log ? r axis, rotation to a corresponding o set along the axis. (3) For non-oblivious watermarking, the log polar transform of the Fourier components of the cover-image can be used instead of template pattern T for retrieving scaling and rotation. The cross correlation can be calculated e ciently using conventional Fourier techniques.
Properties of the watermark
In the following, some of the properties of the watermark generated using the steps described above are discussed. We rst review some of the fundamental properties of the Fourier transform which lead to robustness against cropping, scaling and translation and rotation.
De nition
Let the image be a real valued continuous function f(x 1 ; x 2 ) de ned on an integer-valued Cartesian grid 0 x 1 < N 1 ; 0 x 2 < N 2 .
The Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) is de ned as follows:
f(x 1 ; x 2 )e ?j2 
The DFT of a real image is generally complex valued. This leads to magnitude and phase representation for the image:
(k 1 ; k 2 ) = 6 F(k 1 ; k 2 ) (4)
General Properties of the Fourier Transform
It is extremely instructive to study the e ect of an arbitary linear transform on the spectrum of an image. From this study we will conclude that it is possible to undo the e ect of any linear transformation on an image, even if the image is cropped.
Once N 1 = N 2 (i.e. square blocks) the kernel of the DFT contains a term of the form:
If we compute a linear transform on the spatial coordinates: 
Rotating the image through an angle in the spatial domain causes the Fourier representation to be rotated through the same angle. 
Note that the grid is rotated so the value of the image at the new grid points may not be de ned. The value of the image at the nearest valid grid point can be estimated by interpolation. (14) Note that both F(k 1 ; k 2 ) and its dual f(x 1 ; x 2 ) are periodic functions so it is implicitly assumed that translations cause the image to be \wrapped around". We shall refer to this as a circular translation or a cyclic shift. From property 14 of the Fourier transform it is clear that spatial shifts a ect only the phase representation of an image. This leads to the well known result that the magnitude of the Fourier transform is a circular translation invariant.
Robustness to cropping
One feature of translation invariants developed using the Fourier transform is that they are invariant to circular translations (or cyclic shifts). This is used to construct watermarks that are invariant to cropping. As mentioned above, the image is split into blocks and the watermark is applied to each block. In other words, the same modulation pattern is applied to the Fourier components of each block, wherein the modulation pattern is given by the corresponding encoded messages m. Suppose that the watermark in a standard size block will be of the form: T = AB; CD] where the submatrices A; B; C and D are of arbitrary size. A circular translation of such a watermark is of the form: S = DC; BA]. The original stego-image is tiled with watermarks in the pattern TTTT; TTTT; TTTT]. A little thought demonstrates that a cropped section of the matrix will carry a watermark in the form SSSS; SSSS; SSSS]. When reading the watermark of the cropped image, each block carries the watermark S. Since S is a circular transform of T, it can be read directly in the Fourier domain using the steps outlined above. Note, however, that the cover-image is not tiled, only the watermark is. Therefore, while cropping merely induces a circular translation of the watermark in each block, the change of image in each block is not a circular translation.
The optimum size of block depends on a number of di erent factors. A size that is a power of two is useful because the FFT can be used. The block size also must be small enough to withstand cropping but large enough to comfortably contain a watermark. Heuristically, the best compromise for block size is 128.
Robustness to scaling and rotation
As mentioned earlier, reading the template in log-polar space allows to detect and measure any scaling and/or rotation that was applied to the image. This information can then be used for reading the watermark. Since the reader knows the pattern that was used for modulating the magnitude components, he can identify the modulated components in the scaled and rotated image and extract the message m 0 . Note that the apparatus does not explicitly use a rotation and scale invariant watermark but instead searches the parameter space of rotations and scales. Since searching the space of rotation and scales in the frequency or space domain is quite complicated, the log-polar map is used to map these parameters to Cartesian coordinates where searching can be carried out using e cient correlation techniques.
Robustness to translations
By translation, we mean zero padding of the image such as would occur if an image were placed on a scanner and scanned. In this case the e ect on the watermark blocks may be understood in terms of simple signal and image processing theory. E ectively, zero padding is a multiplication by a rectangular window function in the spatial domain. In the frequency domain this approximates to a convolution with a cardinal sine function. Generally, this blurring of frequency space is not severe. If more than about one third of an watermark block is present the watermark can still be decoded.
Robustness to compression
The watermark is also resistant to compression. It is well known that transform based image compression techniques favour low frequencies in the sense that low frequency content in the original image is better preserved in the compressed image. For this reason, it would seem that a low frequency watermark would be better. However, as mentioned earlier in oblivious watermarking it is necessary to avoid low frequencies for embedding information because the image interferes with the watermark at those frequencies. Fortunately, a compromise is possible: judicious selection of a band of frequencies leads to a watermark that is both oblivious and is su ciently resistant to lossy image compression. One helpful factor is that there are relatively few low frequency components in which to embed a spread spectrum signal. Using midband frequencies actually improves the robustness of the mark because of the increased redundancy of the encoding of the payload.
Robustness of the template pattern
The template pattern is essential to determine the rotation and scaling of the image. Thus its robustness is highly important. There is a good case for arguing that the template is somewhat more robust than the watermark. The reason for this is, that the template actually has to carry less information than the watermark. For example, suppose it is only possible to recover the watermark if the rotation angle and scaling factor recovered using the template are both 99.9% accurate. To give 99.9% accuracy one needs log 2 (1000) 9 bit. Specifying both the angle and the scaling factor therefore needs around 18 bit which is considerably less than the amount of information contained in a typical watermark (about 128 bit).
Redundancy
The watermark is embedded in blocks of a xed size with exactly the same watermark embedded in each block. This means that the watermark can be recovered from a single block only. However the chance of extracting the watermark correctly increases if one has more than one block. Therefore, the reliability of watermark extraction increases with the size of image, as one might expect.
Implementation
To demonstrate the feasibility of the approach, a Java/C++ based copyright protection and authentication environment for digital images has been implemented. The PKI, H, C and B application processes all implement a Graphical User Interface and a server, supporting both console users and other requests through a socket interface.
The communication between the application and the dispatching watermarking proxy process is achieved through a socket interface, giving us a good control over communication security and application location. Flexibility is just one advantage of this technique: the database, watermarking engine and GUI can run on di erent and distant machines. For the rst version of our implementation, we have assumed that all parts of the application are run on the same secure machine. It is, therefore, not necessary to protect the privacy of the connections used by the application internally.
The copyright holder can load images, enter the copyright information, contact C, embed the watermark into the cover-image, save all data encrypted in a database and sell the digital image. Figure 3 illustrates an example of the loaded cover-image together with the copyright information.
We have seen previously that C is important to solve many of the possible attacks of fraudulent people. The C is even indispensable for having legally bound copyright certi cates. Today's copyright laws require that C is in possession of a copy of the cover-image. We can therefore list the following necessary functionality's of C application:
Legally embedded institution backed by the government Provide a server to answer incoming copyright requests Verify consistency of all received copyright requests Save all information persistently and securely, since the data has to be recovered after any restart of the server. Because all transactions are executed electronically, it is obvious that all the requests must be authenticated, secure (integrity, con dentiality) and transactional. The legal binding further requires non-repudiation. In particular, the persistence property is necessary in order to leave the copyright certi cate valid, even if the legal dispute is 20 years later. The data integrity is needed so nobody could claim that the copyright certi cate was forged by C. We can note that the trust that H puts into C is substantial. Therefore C should be backed by some public authority such as the chamber of commerce. Figure 4 shows a screen shot of C GUI. We can note on the console window that the application has created C server on port 4001 and is waiting for incoming copyright requests. The user can list all the copyrights issued. The PKI, implemented as a Trusted Third Party (TTP) Server, issues all certicates for all users. On the basis of the authenticly distributed public key from the TTP, a public/private key-pair along with its associated certi cate may be generated and then passed back as ciphered information to the client. These operations are based on a speci c request from H. The request includes a password for online key generation, key distribution and certi cate handling. The request is protected on the basis of the TTP's public key which was authentically distributed before. The buyer application can contact a copyright holder image server residing per default at port 4003. The buyer can enter the name of the desired image and if the image was already registered at C, H image server sends back the image.
Conclusion
We have presented a new approach for the copyright protection of digital images. This approach is based on asymmetric cryptographic protocols and techniques. In contrast to any other scheme, the combination of a spread spectrum based technique in conjunction with an asymmetric cryptographic technique allows the construction of a one-way function, since only H is able to verify the private watermark. In addition, he may prove that he has the adequate key by verifying the signature of the seed for the payload data. Even if the di erent phases of the approach are known in the public, the security of our approach is not compromised. Compared to other approaches, the following new properties have been identi ed:
(1) Di erent security services for the communication, such as mutual authentication, integrity, con dentiality and non-repudiation are supported along with the protection against copyright infringement by the system with one asymmetric cryptographic key pair. ( 2) The present technique enables a strong binding relation between the image ID, the image and H if H registers his copyright at C. If an image is watermarked later by an unauthorized person, the time stamp in the copyright certi cates resolves the copyright ownership. (3) H does not have to reveal his private cryptographic key if ownership veri cation has to be applied by a di erent legal party. (4) The present technique supports the transferral of copyrights. If a copyright is transferred to another legal party, corresponding copyright revocation certi cates may be generated. (5) Digital signatures are used for the security of the communication between di erent parties and for the authenticity of the data embedded in a public watermark of an image. No signature labelling techniques of the complete image are applied by the system. (6) Circular translation invariants are used as a means of constructing digital watermarks that are invariant to cropping. (7) In contrast to some known techniques, the system does not require a database of watermarks since only the keys are required to embed or extract a watermark. (8) Information is retrieved from the log polar domain of the Fourier transform. Frequency components are modulated which are oblivious to the cover-image but which also have the property that they form an unambiguous non-repeated pattern in log-polar space. They are used for determining the degree of rotation and scaling su ered by a stego-image in the absence of the cover-image. Co-prime frequencies are useful for generating such a pattern or template. Uniform random sampling of log polar space is another method that can be applied.
The approach presented for the copyright protection of digital images can also be extended to other data such as video, audio, and binary data. We are actually investigating new spread spectrum techniques for the watermarking of audio and binary data.
